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Interviewers’ preliminary remarks 
 
As one of the worldwide leading economic geographers, Michael Storper holds 
professorships at renowned universities in three countries: the University of 
California at Los Angeles (UCLA), the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (IEP), 
and the London School of Economics (LSE). His theoretical and empirical work on 
relational assets in regional development has been widely recognized and 
influential beyond disciplinary boundaries (see, in particular, STORPER 1997). 
The following interview aims to retrace the making of Storper’s relational economic 
geography by exploring links between biography, academic networks and 
knowledge production (for recent theoretically informed enquiries into 
‘geographical biographies’, see BARNES 2001, LIVINGSTONE 2002). Secondly, 
we aim to contribute to ongoing debates about Storper’s conceptual arguments, 
not least in German-speaking economic geography, where his concept of a ‘holy 
trinity’ has recently been key to the call for a paradigmatic change in the discipline 
(BATHELT/GLÜCKLER 2002). Finally, we hope that the interview’s emphasis on 
the social construction of economic knowledge will encourage critical engagement 
not only with Storper’s arguments but with one’s own positionality within the 
vibrant field of economic geography. 
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Interview with Michael Storper 
 
Berkeley 
 
Interviewer: You received your academic degrees at the University of California at 
Berkeley in the late 1970s and early 1980s. How did this period and place 
influence your work and your approach to economic geography? 
 
The relationship was quite strong. I was a half generation too late for the revolution 
of the 1960s and early 70s, but from a very young age I had been attracted by all 
the radical things that were happening at the period. So when I was thirteen or 
fourteen years old, I was involved in demonstrations against the Vietnam war, 
hanging out with people older than me. That’s probably one of the reasons why I 
went to Berkeley. Things had happened at other universities, but Berkeley was the 
epicentre of all this action and it had the additional attraction of being linked to San 
Francisco, the epicentre of counter-culture. 
 
I started out studying history and sociology. To be honest, what I was really 
interested in was political activism. I was involved in the environmental movement 
at the same time as I was studying. I took some classes that made me think about 
long-term economic social development as a structured process. I can remember 
the German sociologist Reinhard Bendix distinctly, who wrote classical books 
about the structure of industrial society. The other was a young instructor, Ann 
Swidler, who taught classes about ‘the very long run’, a course about the history of 
family life from 1400 to the 20th century. Those two classes made me realize that 
the world is structured by institutions. But I was also very interested in economics. 
This was the time when the old economy was breaking down and the core regions 
of the country, in the north-east, were losing their employment, the industries were 
shutting down, they were moving to the south or to other countries. All these things 
were really fascinating to me. 
 
Towards the end of my undergraduate career I had to decide what to do. The 
logical thing for me was to do a doctorate in sociology. So I applied to different 
sociology departments, but sociology was a strange discipline at that time. It was 
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torn apart by disputes between ‘new radicals’, Marxists and others, and the ‘old 
schools’ of structural functionalism. To a young person looking at the field, it was 
frightening to see all of your professors fighting with each other. Then I thought 
about becoming an economist, in particular because at Berkeley there were a few 
young radical economists teaching about labour economics. The economy really 
interested me but, once I started going beyond the radicals’ courses, I realized 
what economics was likely to be like, which is, the maths was very difficult, the 
paradigms were very strict. It was attractive in a scientific way, but I felt that I was 
probably never going to be good enough at the mathematical modelling part to be 
a really good economist in the standard sense of it. I struggled through it and 
learned how to do that stuff, but felt in the heart that I wasn’t interested enough to 
put in the effort to be good. 
 
I had a kind of a personal crisis, I thought, what am I going to do with my life? I 
floundered around, and got more deeply involved in environmental activism. After 
a number of campaigns in which I was a kind of voluntary citizen, militant type, I 
got employed in the environmental group ‘Friends of the Earth’, who had its 
headquarters in San Francisco. I started learning how to write reports, to analyze 
things, flying back and forth to Washington, giving testimony, all the aspects of 
political lobbying in America. In a way I laugh at it because I was way too young to 
do it. I really enjoyed it and learned how to function in a political world a bit, but 
after a while I wanted to go back and become an academic. I still didn’t know how I 
was going to do this, go into economics, go into sociology… 
 
Right at that time some friend of mine said, there is this young assistant professor 
in geography, Dick Walker, and you should go and talk to him. I had never taken a 
class in geography, it didn’t mean anything to me. So I went over and talked to this 
young guy who had just arrived from the east coast, where he had been a student 
of David Harvey. Everything that I was interested in, he was interested in. He said 
to me ‘Why don’t you apply to the geography department?’ And that’s how it 
happened. I started out working on environmental questions, but very quickly 
turned to questions of economic geography, the shifting locations of industry, the 
redrawing of the map of the economy. 
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Interviewer: When you started your PhD in the geography department, you had not 
been influenced by any geographical thinking before – you drew your intellectual 
inspirations from history, sociology and economics. How did you experience this 
change in your academic affiliation? 
 
When I came into geography there were, in the Berkeley faculty, a lot of people 
who were interested in what we would call geographical thought. I can remember 
this funny moment when I had to defend my dissertation proposal and the 
committee got together. Dick Walker was my chair and I worked pretty closely with 
Allan Pred, and there was Ann Markusen and Manuel Castells who both taught in 
the city planning department and there was this geographer’s geographer named 
David Hooson. And he said to me, ‘Tell me, what does this have to do with 
geography?’ Well, more elegantly, he wanted me to show how it related to 
geographical thought. To be honest, I had a weak culture in geographical thought 
and I still don’t have all that strong a culture in what people would call the classics 
of geographical thought. My culture is a lot stronger in classics of sociology and 
even economics and I think it probably shows up in my work today. I’m really a 
social scientist. Geography has its feet in a lot of different places, in social science, 
in history, in philosophy, and in the physical sciences. And these other parts are 
relatively foreign to me. In the geography department at Berkeley there were all 
kinds of different intellectual cultures interacting and it took me a long time to 
understand all that was going on. In addition, I had unusually strong relationships 
to this big group of students who were studying regional economic development in 
the city planning department with Manuel Castells, Peter Hall, Ann Markusen and 
a few other people. That was very formative to me, because I had always been 
between and at the edge of different disciplines. 
 
 
Marxism 
 
Interviewer: This was the time when Marxism was strong, when structuralism was 
very strong. To what degree did you subscribe to a Marxist approach in your early 
research? 
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I was hardcore Marxist to begin with. Dick Walker, David Harvey’s star PhD 
student, was known as ‘the new Marxist on campus’. He taught classes with a very 
strong Marxist perspective, and in addition gave classes on how to read Marx’s 
Capital in a place called the ‘East Bay Socialist School’. There was also Manuel 
Castells, Marxist at that time, Ann Markusen, young leader of what is called the 
‘Union for Radical Political Economics’. There was a young economics professor 
called Michael Reich, doing Marxist economics of labour. A number of us were 
trying to expand what David Harvey had begun in his book Social justice and the 
city (HARVEY 1973), and to push it forward into a kind of full-fledged model of, in 
my case, an economic geography. The first article that Dick Walker and I wrote 
together in 1981 was called “Capital and industrial location” (WALKER/STORPER 
1981). While I was still a student, we were beginning to outline ideas that would 
find themselves later in our book The capitalist imperative (WALKER/STORPER 
1989). It was an attempt to see the process of spatial development in the same 
structured way that Marxists saw the rest of the economy. 
 
Interviewer: When did you start to explore alternative paths, divert from the pure 
Marxist way? 
 
Very early on, actually. Dick Walker taught me the big picture about how Marxism 
would view capitalism. Marxism says capitalists exploit workers, fair enough, but 
when you start to look at specifics, a particular industry undergoing organizational 
and locational change – what are the precise mechanisms and processes? In the 
early years, what I was trying to do, was fill in missing layers in the Marxist 
analysis. I was trying to give it what I would call ‘technological realism’. In my 
doctoral research, I took four industries that were undergoing big change. Three of 
them were old industries, steel, textiles and automobiles, and one of them was a 
new industry, microelectronics, semiconductors. And I wanted to see how and why 
they were relocating, and how they chose their relocations. In the middle of 
studying all of that, I came to realize that a whole new economy was in the 
making. If you were trained in Marxist radicalism in those days, you read Harry 
Braverman’s Labour and monopoly capital in which he told the story that 
capitalists use technology to take the skills away from workers (BRAVERMAN 
1974): The purpose of technological change is to streamline and routinize labour 
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processes, so that labourers lose their skills, and their wages are reduced. And 
that’s of course part of the process in a lot of industries. Even the non-Marxist 
sociologists who had studied post-war modernization told this story. But no one 
had yet analyzed a complete cycle of creation of new industries and new sectors. 
 
Right in the middle of all that a number of us started to see the beginnings of 
Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay area. For example, one of my fellow 
students, AnnaLee Saxenian, wrote the first academic paper on Silicon Valley 
(SAXENIAN 1983). She subsequently went away to MIT to do her doctoral thesis, 
but we started out together. We were a group of people who used to go on 
weekends to this funny place, where there was this new electronics industry and 
ask, ‘What’s going on? This is weird, what is all this about?’ The reality started to 
explode in my face. I began to think that somehow, even though Marxism had a lot 
of good lessons, it just seemed really incomplete. For one thing, it didn’t seem to 
get the story about innovation very well.  Marxism is obsessed with the notion of 
crisis in capitalism, and though Marx himself suggested that crises can precede 
innovation, most Marxists are really just interested in how such crises lead either 
to the downfall of capitalism or to negative consequences for the working class.  
The latter is, of course an interesting issue, but the former is not.  Still, at that time, 
I wasn’t actually ready to make a clean break with Marxism. It would take me a 
long time to actually figure out that in the end, though Marxism calls our attention 
to the deep distributional conflicts in capitalism and to its incessant dynamic of 
change, most such issues can be better analyzed with other theories and 
approaches, and that Marxism’s political analyses are largely irrelevant. 
 
 
Los Angeles 
 
Interviewer: After finishing your degree in Berkeley, you went to UCLA. Your work 
started to focus on Hollywood’s film industry and the nature of industrial clusters. 
How did this change come about and how did your work relate to what is often 
referred to as the California School? 
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When I went down to UCLA, I got hired into the city planning department originally, 
and who became my colleague? Ed Soja, a geographer. But also other people 
who were not geographers, one of the major figures of thinking about cities, John 
Friedmann, an Austrian who went to the United States, and Dolores Hayden, a 
famous feminist student of cities. One year before I came to UCLA, Allen Scott 
had arrived from Toronto. He was already beginning to think about the southern 
California economy, about industrial systems and new forms of industrialization, as 
were the Berkeley group because of Silicon Valley. So, another interesting 
collection of people was forming in Los Angeles. 
 
I got to Los Angeles and, as a good geographer,  said to myself, ‘I should figure 
out a new research project and do something here in the region.’ At the time the 
newspapers in LA were filled with stories about the crisis of Hollywood and how 
Hollywood was leaving, going to other places to shoot films. This reminded me of 
issues I dealt with in my dissertation. Along with one of my fellow graduate 
students from Berkeley who had come to LA also to work at that time, Susan 
Christopherson, we decided to study the film industry. We asked why and how 
Hollywood was undergoing reorganization and leaving southern California. 
However, in the middle of our project we discovered that Hollywood was not 
leaving Hollywood. It was staying, but it was reorganizing and a whole new model 
of production organization was coming about, which is what we would call today 
‘flexible specialization’. In the 1920s, 30s and 40s there had been big firms in 
Hollywood, but starting in the 50s and going through the 60s, 70s and 80s, these 
big firms had largely externalized their production to small firms and now there 
was a project by project system of production organization, which actually 
reinforced the agglomeration economies of Hollywood. The average firm size in 
Hollywood had declined. We began to tell a story about an industrial cluster, and in 
so doing discovered the subject. 
 
Right in the middle of this work, Michael Piore and Charles Sabel published The 
second industrial divide (PIORE/SABEL 1984). They had worked a lot on industrial 
districts in the ‘Third Italy’, made a general theory out of it and made it known to 
English speaking audiences. It was a big important book. The notion that we had 
gone from a mass production economy into a flexibly organized network economy. 
  8
1984, that’s when Susan and I are coming up with our interpretation of what’s 
going on in Hollywood, when AnnaLee Saxenian is working on Silicon Valley, 
when Allen Scott is working on the electronics components industry and the 
clothing industry in southern California. Through the work of Piore and Sabel we 
learned that there were all these people who had written about the phenomenon of 
small firm clusters in Italy. So we started to read them, for example the classical 
book on Italy by Arnaldo Bagnasco, The three Italies (BAGNASCO 1977). Then of 
course the Florentine school led by Giacomo Becattini. All of a sudden there is this 
shape of a new world coming about. Until then what people really thought about 
were big industries and mass production. Clusters, small firms and networks just 
didn’t exist as a thought paradigm. It wasn’t what we were taught to look for. It 
started to congeal at this moment, both empirically and theoretically. 
 
The ‘California School’ – I don’t know if it really is a school – was only part of a 
movement that was popping up in different places. There was the Piore and Sabel 
branch, which was MIT-centered, there was what was going on in Italy, and later 
there was a smattering of Germans trying to deal with places like Baden-
Württemberg, and a few Danes… The image of the new realities started to emerge 
and then communication started to happen between the different places where 
people were thinking about their own realities. The California School was in part a 
reaction to that. That’s what became for me a second wave of theoretical work, 
where Allen Scott and I tried to think about the theory of agglomeration. We tried 
to draw on the classical works about the division of labour and scale and scope 
and how changes in that might produce changes in the linkages of firms and 
hence the geography of either clustering or spreading out. Once again, that was 
something that wasn’t necessarily incompatible with Marxism but certainly wasn’t 
part of Marxism. 
 
 
The ‘holy trinity’: Technology, organization and territory 
 
Interviewer: In your book ‘The regional world’, published in 1997, you come up 
with the concept of a ‘holy trinity’ in which you link technology, organization and 
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territory to explain regional differences in economic development. How did you 
arrive at this heterodox approach? 
 
To understand where this came from I need to add a couple of more biographical 
elements. Already in the book that Dick Walker and I did in the late 1980s there 
was a kind of hybrid thing going on. We were trying to deal with new, flexible forms 
of industrialization by coming up with notions of technological and organizational 
change that were behind the ‘capitalist imperative’. After this first phase of working 
on theories of agglomeration and the division of labour I wanted to have a more 
systematic understanding of technological and organizational change, of those 
forces that would lead to agglomeration or dispersion of industry. I began to 
interact more with economists and organization theorists. Around that time there 
were two really interesting things happening. One was that some economists were 
starting to talk about what is now known as evolutionary processes of 
technological change. They were also talking about these processes as somehow 
institutionally structured. They began to come up with the notion that technological 
change is highly structured by institutions and that these institutions tend to differ 
from place to place. What we now call national systems of innovation – why, say, 
is Germany developing some technologies and going in one direction and the 
United States is developing other technologies and going in a different direction? 
There were random factors, but what we actually end up using or implementing 
gets selected by the institutions that are there to make choices at certain points. 
There are then distinctive evolutionary pathways of technology. They are not 
necessarily optimal or defined by any perfect efficiency criterion. This was a major 
thing happening in the late 1980s and early 1990s and I started to be interested in 
this because of my research in comparative industrial agglomeration. 
 
I should also say that being involved in studies of agglomerations and local 
industrial systems, both Allen Scott and I had begun to make regular trips to Italy 
where we were interacting with the ‘Third Italy’ group. And we had started 
interacting with the MIT group. I know there were things we were learning about 
Baden-Württemberg at the time too, the people were starting to filter into the 
English language literature. For one thing, Gary Herrigel had studied with Charles 
Sabel and was writing for ‘Anglo-Saxons’ about Germany and then people like 
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Wolfgang Streek and a few others, I can remember papers coming out of the 
Wissenschaftszentrum in Berlin. So, when you start interacting, two things happen 
to you intellectually. You begin to see the commonalities, but you also start to see 
differences. 
 
For me the question of difference and specificity in these forms of new industrial 
development began to be interesting. I applied for a grant in the late 80s from the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States. What I proposed to do was a three 
country comparative study of industrial districts: United States, France and Italy. 
The real reason that France was in there was because I spoke French. We had 
had more interaction with the Italians, but I spoke French and thought I might as 
well play to my talents, so I based myself in Paris. That’s where the European 
branch of the story started. It was absolutely not planned to become Euro-
American, which is in fact what has happened to me. There is obviously a 
personal history side of it, falling in love, the other thing was building networks of 
colleagues and intellectual networks and getting invited back, ultimately leading to 
a kind of institutionalization. I ended up being equally influenced by what was 
going on in the English-language world and by what was happening in certain 
parts of Europe. 
 
In that year funded by the German Marshall Fund I started out comparing different 
institutional forms of industrial districts. It was really difficult to come up with a 
theory. For example, I was comparing the furniture industry in the United States 
and in the ‘Third Italy’. I thought, ok, I can describe this. In America, we make 
furniture in large numbers, mass production. In Italy they make mostly design, high 
quality furniture. What really struck me in trying to do this comparative work was 
that the ways that people relate to each other are different. That seems very basic, 
but in trying to study this question I met some French colleagues who were 
working on what they called conventions. Ultimately institutions exist in our lives 
because we incorporate them in our individual actions. They came up with the 
notion that the way they are incorporated in our individual actions are through 
conventions, which are something like principles of mutual expectations by which 
we relate to each other. And these differ from industry to industry and from place 
to place. 
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I thought that this would be an interesting way to explain why the Italians organize 
their furniture industry as a high quality design-oriented industry based on face-to-
face interpersonal contact, while the Americans apply principles of mass 
production to theirs. In the actual daily life of doing this, there are different 
conventions at work. Robert Salais and I came up with the idea that basically 
these were like systems of action, which we called ‘worlds’ or ‘worlds of 
production’. So, we did a book together on the subject, which came out in 1993 in 
French as Les mondes de production and then in 1997 in English 
(SALAIS/STORPER 1993, 1997). Behind all that, I was seeing the geography 
issue and I began to think that this was an interesting way into the comparative 
analysis of different regions. It was the notion that regions are different because 
the people in them are caught up in different systems of conventions, that is 
different systems of action and co-ordination of their actions. 
 
Most economic geography had concentrated on linkages in the sense of ‘linkages 
are basically processes of trade’ – local trade in labour market or local trade in 
products, inputs and outputs. Remember, this is against a background of an 
empirical reality where there is less and less local trade in a lot of industries, there 
is long distance trade, cheapening transport and cheapening communication. I do 
not mean to say that local trade is never important. Obviously, when you look at 
industrial clusters in the Third Italy, it is. Local trade is important. But at that time, 
even in Silicon Valley, the system was maturing, there was a lot of long distance 
investment in Singapore and Malaysia, there were factories being opened up in 
the interior of the United States. So, what was going on in the local part of the 
system and why were these people clustering together? From the work on 
conventions, I began to think, maybe what these people share is not that they are 
shipping products back and forth across the street, it’s that somehow they are co-
ordinated by shared systems of action. This is what I tried to capture in the term 
untraded interdependencies. These seemed to matter more in some cases than 
the traded linkages. 
 
Interviewer: And this is where the threads come together … 
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Yes, that led me to the holy trinity. I’d been really steeped in all this work about 
technological change and evolutionary economics. All those people were talking 
about technological spillovers. They were on to this mystery of technological 
change which is both an individual and a collective process. From what I was 
thinking about action systems and their geography, of people being close together 
because of sharing principles that enable them to co-ordinate with each other, it 
was a short leap to saying that maybe what actually enables people to bring about 
these technological spillovers in localized space, is that they have untraded 
interdependencies between each other. That was step number one: technologies 
in the holy trinity. 
 
Then, step number two was firms. The most important form of organization in 
capitalism is the firm. The economy is like a big puzzle of overlapping 
organizational levels. There’s the sectoral level, the firm level, the industrial 
system level, the technological field level, the regional level, the national level … 
for me it’s like an organizational puzzle. It seemed to me that fundamentally to 
understand the geography of the economy, you had to understand the 
construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of its organizational forms. If you 
look at an economy in a dynamic perspective, what you have are production 
systems that mutate – sometimes into a big firm, sometimes into a fragmented 
production system, sometimes into combinations of these. That’s driven by 
technologies largely. The technologies drive economies of scale and scope and 
transaction costs and that makes organizational systems mutate into different 
forms. But firms exist partly because of shared action systems among people that 
tie them together and make firms or production systems work the way they do. 
That had to be the second element of a holy trinity. 
 
And then of course, because of all the work on agglomeration, there was territory. 
As a geographer, I had been able to see that technologies have a big impact on 
driving these organizational mutations. And these organizational mutations in turn 
create needs for co-ordination among the different units that are the results of 
those processes. And the co-ordinations of those linkages have a geography. But 
it’s not just that. Geography is not just an outcome but also a cause – now here is 
where I really do have a geographer’s culture. Once you’ve studied places, you 
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know that the people in the places have shared conventions that enable them to 
co-ordinate. It’s an additional level of co-ordination of modern economic and social 
life, that has its own existence in addition to all the other levels that we know 
about, like sectors and firms. And therefore geography actually could have 
feedback effects on how production systems are organized and even on what 
kinds of technologies are produced because the ability of people to co-ordinate 
together would have an effect on what kinds of technological synergies they could 
have. Three subdivisions, but each of them having dynamic feedbacks on the 
other. And each of them being co-ordinated in hard ways through hard linkages 
and traded processes, but also in soft ways through untraded interdependencies. 
 
Interviewer: What inspired you to use a religious metaphor – holy trinity – for the 
three key elements of your concept? 
 
I was writing a paper for an Italian conference. There is this colloquium every two 
years in Tuscany, which is organized by Professor Becattini’s group in Florence. 
It’s called the ‘Incontri pratesi sullo sviluppo locale’ and is held in the Villa Medicea 
di Artimino. I had been invited to this meeting before, but in 1996 they invited me 
to give the opening speech in the town hall of Prato. I had to do it in Italian, so I 
had to find some way to overcome the fact that my Italian is really terrible. I 
thought, ‘well, I’ve got a triangle of things’ – this goes to show you how really silly 
these things are –‘it’s a catholic country, what’s three things? It’s the holy trinity!’. I 
called up an Italian friend and asked, ‘how do you say holy trinity in Italian?’ And 
so she said to me santissima trinità. I wrote the speech and faxed it to her and she 
corrected all the Italian, and I got up there in the town hall of Prato and said – it 
was the first time I had ever gone public with this – I want to propose to you that 
the way you can see regional development is as a holy trinity. That’s how it came 
about. Everyone laughed – I got their attention, that was the story. 
 
 
Territorialization, embeddedness and relations 
 
Interviewer: Your work has opened up the way for a relational perspective in 
economic geography that emphasizes the importance of social and institutional 
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contexts for economic processes. In sociology, Mark GRANOVETTER’S (1985) 
concept of embeddedness has been similarly influential. Do you see a link 
between your notion of territory and Granovetter’s embeddedness? 
 
I’ve always been very strongly admiring Mark Granovetter, who I think is a really 
brilliant sociologist. That’s certainly something that inspired me as a geographer, 
that these industrial systems, these processes of technology development and 
change are not just sectorally determined, they’re not just determined by non-
geographical forces, something about places is making a distinctive contribution. 
The places are not just outcomes, they’re causes. I’ve been struggling to make 
this point, to say that economic geography is not just about showing that the 
economy has a geography. That is, the economy expresses itself in geographical 
forms, but the geography makes the economy. Now, where is the problem with 
that? The problem is that as an assertion it doesn’t mean anything. And it can’t just 
be that the economy is spatially differentiated, therefore the geography makes the 
economy. You have to show that what happens in places has an influence on 
processes and forces that affect not only that place but other places. 
 
Embeddedness is a good starting point. It suggests that certain forms of social 
actions are not transitive and contextless but somehow that the interaction context 
of these things matters. Still, as a geographer I felt that embeddedness needed to 
be pushed forward. There’s a kind of residual analytical vagueness in the concept 
of embeddedness. In some senses the stuff I’ve been into more recently about 
information and knowledge and how understanding and communicating certain 
forms of knowledge depends not only on the knowledge itself but on the context in 
which it operates. 
 
For me, the way to deal with context was the concept of relations, that somehow 
the action that a given economic agent can make depends on the interactions or 
the relational context of that action. Economics tells us about the sovereign actor, 
who, given a preference function and given some information, will make a choice. 
I’m of course inspired by the critique of that position, which is that in a lot of 
situations, we’re not fully sovereign, we are actually interdependent to some 
degree, but then, what does interdependence mean? The way that I tried to give 
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some substance to that was through the concept of relations. I see it as part of the 
project of articulating the notion of embeddedness.  
 
 
Cultural perspectives 
 
Interviewer: More recently, the notion of a ‘cultural turn’ has entered Anglo-
American economic geography. How do you relate to this widening of perspectives 
in the field? 
 
This might sound strange coming from me, because many hardcore economic 
geographers or economists would probably see me as being very cultural. And yet 
I’m personally very uncomfortable with much of what is self-defined as the cultural 
turn in economic geography, actually the cultural turn in geography in general. I 
criticized it in a polemical article I wrote about this subject (STORPER 2001). 
Behavioural, institutional, cultural, historical processes are  of great importance  to 
the way any economy develops. But the bottom line is, if you want to do good 
economic geography, you have to have economics. And economics is about 
analyzing causal processes that make markets work. I don’t mean work in a 
necessarily positive way – it just enables us to get causes and effects. You can’t 
dissolve the economics out of economic geography and still have economic 
geography. 
 
The problem with certain people is that they want to describe the economy as one 
big cultural process. But it isn’t. There are analytically describable forces in the 
economy. The laws of supply and demand have really big effects, whether it’s in 
Heidelberg or in Toulouse or in Bamako. I’m against the notion that the cultural 
replaces the economic in economic geography. It may complement it, but it does 
not replace it. 
 
Interviewer: What about the study of economic actors and their cultural practices, 
which can add an important dimension to understanding financial centres like the 
City of London, as, for example, Linda McDOWELL’S (1997) work has shown? 
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Of course there are many different and legitimate ways to study something like the 
City of London. It’s a fantastically complex thing, it’s an economic system, it’s a 
system of social practices and interactions, it has cultural dimensions, it has 
symbolic dimensions, there are all kinds of social networks involved, it’s 
representative in different ways, it’s got organizations, it’s got politics. So, sure, 
there is room for a lot of different things to be going on there. 
 
It does seem to me though, that if you decide that what you are going to do is 
study the economic geography of, let’s say, the advanced financial services 
industry, you cannot do that by merely calling attention to the cultures of the 
people involved. In other words, you can’t say the economic geography of the 
advanced financial services sector in the world economy, of which the City of 
London is a major empirical manifestation, is explainable by the shared culture of 
financial managers, for example. For it to become an economic geography 
explanation, the story would have to be that the shared culture is the scarce 
resource, which the system economizes in the best way by concentrating the 
people who have this scarce resource in particular geographical areas. To tell an 
economic story, you have to, at some point, use economics. 
 
There is another thing that is very bothersome to me about some of what I’m 
calling the ‘cultural turn’. The historical weakness of geography as a discipline is 
its attraction to particularism and specificity, because of the belief that real places 
are specific and different. The economists are the kings and queens of generality 
and universality, and we’re the kings and queens of specificity and particularity. 
There is an atavistic impulse in a lot of geography, we’ve got to fly back to 
localism. In my view, the bad way to do that is to do old fashioned regional, 
ideographic geography. The good way to do it is to develop general theories that 
enable you to explain specific empirical processes. These can then be integrated 
into complex context-rich cases. This is different, however, from just doing 
descriptive regional geography. 
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Economic perspectives 
 
Interviewer: Almost parallel with the ‘cultural turn’ in geography, we could witness 
a ‘spatial turn’ in economics, manifested in a so-called New Economic Geography 
(e.g. FUJITA/KRUGMAN/VENABLES 1999). How do you evaluate this 
development? 
 
The economists are doing good and bad at the same time. Let’s start with the 
good part of their critique. Five or six years ago, I heard a talk by Paul Krugman. 
He made some points that hurt, but hit home. He said, ‘I read a bunch of this 
regional science from the 50s, 60s and 70s, people like Walter Isard. A lot of what 
they were doing was interesting but because they didn’t have a causal theory, they 
tried to deal with complexity by piling on layers.’ So in the end you get a ‘layer 
cake’, which of course just collapses under its own weight, which is exactly what 
happened to regional science. The most unbelievably complex systems on 
systems on systems, really fancy statistical analysis, but pretty bad theory. 
 
Modern differential calculus, plus general or partial equilibrium theory can enable 
you to cut through a lot of that and write simpler models than the regional scientist 
could do. And that’s exactly what Krugman and the new economists did. They 
came along with better math, better computers and a good mastery of general and 
partial equilibrium theory and took all of these complex ‘layer cake systems’ and 
wrote what are relatively simple models that do better. And here is the horrible 
paradox – it’s the geographers who should have been thinking not just about 
places as complex things that we have to describe densely. Places aren’t just 
isolated, they are in constant relations to other places through factor mobility and 
trade, and hence each place’s price formation and factor formation processes are 
caught up in relations of exchange and competition with other places. The New 
Economic Geography economists retheorized these relations in some very 
effective and innovative ways. 
 
The bad part is that these economists don’t have much of the sensitivity that we 
geographers, or sociologists or political scientists or students of technology have 
about real economies. They have simplifications that we find violent and 
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unacceptable. Some of these economists are also very resistant to the soft side of 
things, the more complex behavioural patterns, relational issues and all that. 
Although economics of information is really into that now in very powerful ways. 
I’m very divided about it. In a lot of ways, these economists made a genuine new 
contribution, they put economics back into geography and geography back into 
economics. Our job though is to now accept the advances they’ve made, but to 
show them how to do it with greater geographical sensitivity. They are already at a 
risk of trivializing it into a new form of regional science. And that would be too bad, 
because the underlying questions they have opened up with their theoretical 
innovations are really interesting and important. 
 
 
Challenges 
 
Interviewer: We have talked about two poles in current thinking about economic 
geography. One is the new economists’ version of a geographical economics, the 
other a ‘cultural turn’ in economic geography itself. Where do you personally see 
the interesting and pressing theoretical questions for the field? 
 
My dreamworld would be one where something like the holy trinity could be made 
more and more precise and operational. I really believe that there is this field of 
interlocking dynamics. And the problem is that each part of the holy trinity is in 
itself very complex, because the dynamics of technology, the dynamics of 
organizations, the dynamics of territories, each one in itself separately would be 
very difficult. Because each has a hard and a soft side and each has an 
evolutionary dynamic that also affects the evolutionary dynamic of the other. In 
fact, the reason that I proposed it was to show that the geographical dynamics are 
not just outcomes but causes of the economy and its structures. Here is where I 
have always felt that geography was never given its fair recognition. You ask an 
economist, is technology important to the evolutionary of the economy, and they’ll 
say yes. You ask an economist, are institutions important to the evolution of the 
economy, and they’ll say yes. You ask an economist, is politics important to the 
evolution of the economy, and they’ll say yes. If you ask them about geography (at 
least until very recently), a lot of them will say, ‘Mmh, I don’t know.’ And of course, 
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that’s an error. Geography isn’t just an expression of the economy, it also forms 
the economy. The holy trinity attempts to suggest why this proposition makes 
scientific sense. So, I hope that there will be work that pushes it forward and 
makes it more operational. The people who have already made some progress in 
this direction are the evolutionary economists of technology. But it’s up to us, 
really, to develop the tools and the analytical models and the measures and the 
evidence. 
 
There are also the classical questions: what are the changes in patterns of 
location, in the specialization of cities, regions, and nations in the world economy, 
what are the resulting patterns of trade and economic development? My sense of 
it is that every social science discipline has things to contribute to those. But many 
of the essential questions of the 21st century are questions about geography, 
because they concern globalization (of goods, services, information and money), 
technological diffusion, and migration. And we have better tools for dealing with 
them than we used to. I think we now need a generation of rigorously-trained 
economic geographers who are able and willing to tackle them. 
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